The federal government’s move to bring state-licensed medical marijuana into Schedule III was supposed to end decades of limbo. Instead, according to the head of the association that represents state cannabis regulators, the way the Drug Enforcement Administration has rolled out its registration system in recent weeks has split state markets in two, left regulators guessing about the rules in their own states, and put some patients at risk of losing access to the products they rely on.
The argument comes from Gillian L. Schauer, executive director of the Cannabis Regulators Association, known as CANNRA, in an opinion piece published by Marijuana Moment on November 16, 2026. Schauer writes that late last month the DEA took three significant actions at once: it issued guidance to businesses that had applied for DEA registration, it issued orders to show cause concerning DEA registration, and it granted the first Schedule III medical marijuana registrations. In her account, those actions arrived with little or no advance notice to state regulators and minimal communication afterward, and the consequences are still unfolding state by state.
Her piece is an opinion argument, the case made by the regulators’ own association. But the federal record underneath it is not in dispute, and it helps explain why a long-awaited change has produced, in her words, deep uncertainty.
What Actually Changed In Federal Law
Marijuana has been a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law since 1970. The road out began in October 2022, leading to a Department of Health and Human Services recommendation in August 2023 to move marijuana to Schedule III. On May 21, 2024, the Justice Department and the DEA published a notice of proposed rulemaking, at 89 Federal Register 44597, proposing that move, drawing nearly 43,000 public comments.
That broader proposal is still not finished. A narrower step did take effect in 2026. On April 28, 2026, a final order at 91 Federal Register 22714 placed two categories in Schedule III: drug products containing marijuana approved by the Food and Drug Administration, and marijuana handled under a state medical marijuana license, under the Attorney General’s authority in 21 U.S.C. 811(d). Adult-use marijuana was not covered and remains in Schedule I. The broader question remains pending in its own DEA hearing: testimony ran from June 29 to July 15, 2026, the proceeding paused on September 29 while the judge considered adding a Government Accountability Office report to the record, and written briefs were filed in early November. No final decision has been announced. A December 2025 executive order, Executive Order 14370, directed the Attorney General to expedite the process, but it did not itself reschedule anything.
The Timely Applicant Letter And The Two-Market Problem
The first of the three DEA actions Schauer criticizes is a guidance letter sent to what the agency calls timely applicants: businesses that filed complete applications for DEA registration between April 28 and June 26, 2026. According to the op-ed and to independent summaries of the same guidance, the letter tells timely applicants that they may engage in Schedule III medical marijuana activities with other timely applicants and with DEA registrants, but that they may not lawfully do so with businesses that did not apply in that window or have not applied at all, until those businesses become registrants. Trading outside that circle, the letter warns, could be grounds for denial of an application or revocation of a registration. Timely applicants were given until November 29, 2026, to establish compliant supply chains.
Schauer’s central claim is that this single instruction has, virtually overnight, bifurcated most state medical marijuana marketplaces into two markets: one made up of DEA registrants and timely applicants, and one made up of state licensees who are neither. Because states directly or indirectly outlaw interstate commerce in marijuana, she argues, many states will not have enough cultivators, manufacturers and dispensaries inside either circle to support a viable supply chain in either market.
She offers concrete illustrations, presented as findings from state regulators assessing their own markets. In one state, nearly three-quarters of licensed dispensaries are timely applicants, leaving few dispensaries in the state-only market. In another, most dispensaries applied but only a few cultivators did, making a complete in-state DEA supply chain impossible without interstate commerce, which that state prohibits. In a third, all third-party testing laboratories applied, leaving no labs in the state-only market. Regulators, she writes, have largely been unable to obtain a usable list of which businesses in their own states are timely applicants or registrants; the agency’s list identified applicants only by de-identified DEA numbers. Independent reporting put the applicant pool at roughly 6,983 locations nationwide.
The first registrations themselves were substantial. On October 30, 2026, the Justice Department announced that the DEA was issuing registrations to more than 900 medical marijuana dispensaries in seven states: Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. It was the first time state-licensed dispensaries had received federal registration, and the department described it as the first phase of implementing the April order. Manufacturers and distributors were still under review.
Orders To Show Cause And The State-Policy Fight
The second action Schauer describes is a set of orders to show cause delivered to DEA applicants in at least seven states or jurisdictions, stating that state policies will prevent the applicants from being registered. The orders, as she summarizes them, flag four kinds of state policy: dual-purpose licensing approaches that let a licensee participate in both the medical and the adult-use marketplace; self-certification programs under which certain patients, such as veterans or patients in hospice care, can certify that they have a qualifying condition; programs that allow dispensing without a certification or prescription; and synthetic cannabinoids dispensed within the medical marijuana supply chain.
The problem, in her account, is not only the substance but the pattern. The orders state that because of the identified deficiencies in a state’s policy, the DEA cannot permit any applicant operating under that state’s regime to participate in the federal registration system, which would mean every applicant in an affected state can expect to receive one. Yet, she writes, the orders have typically reached only a small number of applicants in each affected state so far, delivered inconsistently in timing and method, and states with very similar dual-purpose licensing rules have been treated differently: applicants in some such states received orders questioning their eligibility, while applicants in others received the timely applicant letter instead. That leaves businesses reordering their supply chains to comply with one letter while not knowing whether an order disqualifying their whole state is coming next.
What This Means For Patients
Schauer’s third section turns to patients, and it is where her argument is most specific. The self-certification programs targeted in the orders to show cause, she notes, generally serve patients receiving hospice care and veterans whose care comes through the Department of Veterans Affairs, where clinicians are not permitted to write a medical cannabis recommendation. Those programs, she writes, represent a small share of state certifications and exist for patients who cannot easily obtain a clinician’s written recommendation.
She also points to the memorandums of agreement that timely applicants must sign before receiving DEA registration, which in her account include a commitment not to dispense marijuana to any qualifying out-of-state patient or caregiver. That would end medical reciprocity inside the federal system, making it difficult for patients to obtain medical marijuana when they travel to another state. And she returns to the supply-chain split for a final, practical example: a patient in a rural area served by a single dispensary could lose access to the specific products that patient uses if the dispensary applied for DEA registration and the manufacturer of those products did not, or if operators on either side of an incomplete supply chain simply go out of business.
CANNRA, she writes, has continued to raise these issues with the DEA without substantive engagement, while regulators try to keep serving patients and running viable, compliant state markets without sufficient information about the agency’s plans.
An Argument To Weigh, On A Record Still Being Written
None of this makes the underlying change small. Moving state-licensed medical marijuana into Schedule III, and registering more than 900 dispensaries federally for the first time, are genuine milestones. But Schauer’s op-ed is a reminder that the milestone and the implementation are two different things. The broader case remains undecided, adult-use marijuana remains in Schedule I, and the medical system that did move is being rebuilt, on a November 29 deadline, around a distinction between businesses that filed in a two-month window and businesses that did not. Whether the DEA answers the regulators’ questions, and how the broader case is decided, will determine whether the uncertainty she describes is a rough transition or the new normal.
Source: Marijuana Moment; U.S. Department of Justice; Federal Register; Cannabis Regulators Association
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